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FROM CRUZAN TO SCHIAVO: 
SIMILAR BEDFELLOWS IN FACT 
AND AT LAW 
Edward J. Larson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whatever else may be said about it, Terri Schiavo's death 
was legal. It scrupulously complied with Florida state law.1 Un-
der similar facts, a similar result would occur under the laws of 
most (if not all) states? Further, those state laws are constitu-
tional. They comply with the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tional regime outlined in the key United States Supreme Court 
decision dealing with the issue of terminating life-sustaining 
medical treatment for incapacitated patients, Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health.3 Indeed, Terri Schiavo's case 
cannot be materially distinguished from Nancy Cruzan's case. 
Reaching a different result in the Schiavo case would require 
• Talmadge Professor of Law and Russell Professor of History, University of 
Georgia. For their willingness to review a draft of this article during their summer holi-
days, the author wishes to thank his colleagues Thomas A. Eaton and James C. Smith of 
the University of Georgia School of Law and Robert Cochran of Pepperdine University 
School of Law. His thanks also go to the student editors at Constitutional Commentary, 
particularly Megan Healy. Finally, the author wishes to acknowledge Michael Stokes 
Paulsen for affording him the opportunity to write this article rather than hike so much 
with his family in Austria. The relative dearth of citations in this article is due more to 
the state of research materials in American law at the University of lnnsbruck than to the 
author's principled desire to reverse the trend toward excessive citation in law review 
articles. 
1. Robert T. Miller, The Legal Death of Terri Schiavo, FIRsT THINGS, May 2005, 
at 14-16. Miller, a critic of the process, evaluates all of the legal claims brought by 
Schiavo's parents to stop the removal of the feeding tube, showing that none had merit 
under Florida law. 
2. ld. at 14; Thomas A. Eaton and Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the 
"Right to Die" in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REv. 1253, 1279-80 (1991) 
("When the evidence is 'clear' that the patient would refuse life-sustaining treatment, 
courts have consistently upheld the authority of the surrogate decisionmaker to withhold 
consent, regardless of whether the patient is deemed 'terminal' or of the nature of the 
treatment to be withheld.") 
3. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
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that Cruzan be ignored, overruled, or distinguished to the point 
that its meaning would be reversed. This article examines how 
the result in Schiavo inevitably follows from the reasoning in 
Cruzan. Pro-life reformers intent on preventing future Schiavo-
type deaths must change both (1) state laws like that of the Flor-
ida Health Care Advance Directive Act4 and (2) the larger body 
of common and constitutional law in which they are situated. 
II. THE FACfS OF SCHIAVO AND CRUZAN 
Although some partisans dispute various details of the 
Schiavo case, for purposes of this article I presume that the fol-
lowing material facts are true. In 1990 at age 26, Terri Schiavo 
suffered brain damage caused by a cardiac arrest possibly 
brought on by a potassium deficiency in her blood due to buli-
mia. Every doctor who personally examined her determined that 
she was in a "persistent vegetative state." A feeding tube was 
used to provide nutrition and hydration, without which she 
would die. In the annals of medicine, virtually no one has re-
gained consciousness after being in a persistent vegetative state 
for as long as Schiavo, and no one has ever done so without suf-
fering severe, permanent physical and mental impairment. 5 In 
1998, after seven years of continuing medical care for Schiavo, 
her husband requested removal of the feeding tube. Her parents 
objected, and the issue went to court. 
Schiavo had not executed any form of health care advance 
directive (such as a living will or durable power of attorney for 
health care). A Florida circuit court found (1) that Schiavo was 
in a persistent vegetative state and (2) that she would not want 
to be kept alive in this condition "on a machine." This second 
finding was based on the testimony of Michael Schiavo and his 
siblings regarding oral statements that Schiavo had made to 
them prior to her illness, which the court found to be clear and 
convincing evidence as to Schiavo's wishes. The court ordered 
that Schiavo's feeding tube be removed. Schiavo's parents ap-
pealed this decision, but it was upheld by nineteen separate 
judges over an eight-year legal battle. On March 18, 2005, in 
compliance with the court order, Schiavo's feeding tube was dis-
connected. She died 13 days later. 
4. FLA. STAT. § 765 (2000). 
5. The severe and irreversible nature of Schiavo's brain damage was confirmed by 
a post-mortem autopsy. David Brown and Shailagh Murray, Schiavo Brain Damage 'Ir-
reversible' Autopsy Finds, WASH. POST, June 16, 2005, at A-01. 
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Compare these facts with those of the Cruzan case, as stated 
in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist.6 On Decem-
ber 11, 1983, at age 25, Nancy Cruzan suffered severe brain 
damage after she lost control of her car and the vehicle over-
turned. When paramedics arrived at the accident scene, Cruzan 
was not breathing and her heart had stopped. An attending neuro-
surgeon concluded that she had suffered cerebral contusions 
compounded by significant lack of oxygen. Permanent brain 
damage results from a lack of oxygen after just six minutes; it 
was estimated that Cruzan lacked oxygen for at least twice that 
long. In the weeks that followed her accident, Cruzan passed 
from a coma to a persistent vegetative state from which she 
never recovered. A feeding tube was used to provide her nutri-
tion and hydration. As an adult resident of Missouri, Cruzan was 
cared for in a state hospital at government expense. Five years 
later, after it became apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance 
of regaining her mental facilities, her parents (as next of kin) asked 
that the feeding tube be disconnected and that Cruzan be al-
lowed to die from a lack of food and water. Hospital employees 
refused to honor this request without a court order, and the par-
ents took the issue to court. 
The Cruzan case then began its long odyssey in court. Rea-
soning that a person in Cruzan's condition would have a consti-
tutional right to terminate tube feeding that she should not lose 
simply because she could no longer exercise it, a state trial court 
authorized Cruzan's parents to exercise it on her behalf based on 
evidence of Cruzan's wishes. The evidence offered at trial con-
sisted of Cruzan's '"expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in 
somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend that if 
sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she 
could live at least halfway normally."'7 The state appealed, and 
the Missouri Supreme Court found that Cruzan's comments to 
her friend were "'unreliable for the purpose of judgment on 
[Cruzan's] behalf."'8 Absent a valid living will, the Court insisted 
on "'clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence'" of Cru-
zan's intent before discontinuing life-sustaining treatment.9 By a 
5 to 4 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, as against a 
challenge that Missouri's determination violated Nancy Cruzan 
6. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266-68. 
7. /d. at 268 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at A98-99, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. 
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
8. 497 U.S. at 268 (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424,426 (1988)). 
9. 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting 769 S.W. at 425). 
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of liberty without due process of law.10 Returning to the state 
trial court, Cruzan's parents submitted testimony from three new 
witnesses regarding Cruzan's wishes expressed when she was 
competent, which the court found to establish clearly and con-
vincingly that she would want her treatment terminated. The 
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to review the decision. On December 15, 1990, in com-
pliance with the court order, Cruzan's feeding tube was discon-
nected. She died eleven days later. 
Under the law, similar facts should lead to similar results-
and here the facts are remarkably similar. Terri Schiavo and 
Nancy Cruzan both grew up in suburban, white, middle-class, 
Roman Catholic homes-Schiavo in Pennsylvania and Cruzan in 
Missouri. While still in their twenties, both women suffered se-
vere trauma and slipped into persistent vegetative states from 
which they were unlikely to recover. Due to the lack of oxygen 
to their brains during their initial medical emergencies, both 
women probably incurred permanent brain damage. In both 
cases, their lives were sustained for years by tubes supplying nu-
trition and hydration directly into their stomachs and, given their 
age and medical conditions, both women could have lived for 
decades more with little or no other treatment than what they 
received through their feeding tubes. Without the tubes, how-
ever, they would die in a matter of days from lack of food and 
water. 
Assuming the facts outlined above, which were those found 
by the relevant courts, there were two potentially significant dif-
ferences between the Schiavo and Cruzan cases. First, Cruzan's 
family uniformly supported the decision to end tube feeding 
while Schiavo's family was sharply divided. Schiavo's husband 
initiated the legal process to discontinue tube feeding while her 
parents and siblings opposed it. Second, the two women resided 
in different states: Schiavo in Florida and Cruzan in Missouri. As 
Justices O'Connor and Scalia stressed in their concurring opin-
ions in Cruzan, and as the court later underscored when uphold-
ing Washington State's law against assisted suicide in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg,11 different states can impose different laws 
governing end-of-life medical care. In her Cruzan opinion, Jus-
tice O'Connor spoke of entrusting such matters "to the 'labora-
10. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, '1E7 (1990). 
11. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
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tory' of the states."12 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
bluntly asserted that "federal courts have no business in this 
field." It is for the states to decide "the point at which life be-
comes 'worthless,' and the point at which the means necessary to 
preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,"' he 
wrote.13 Thus, under current constitutional analysis, the state in 
which a person like Schiavo or Cruzan live can impact what 
treatment they do (or do not) receive. 
Under the reasoning of Cruzan, however, neither of these 
two potentially significant differences should distinguish these 
two cases. This follows as a matter of Missouri and Florida law. 
In Cruzan, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the 
Missouri Supreme Court that, under its state law, the legal right 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment (including tube feeding) re-
sided solely with the patient and not with the patient's family. 14 
Thus, for her parents to obtain a court order terminating Cru-
zan' treatment, they were required to submit clear and convinc-
ing evidence of their daughter's wishes on the subject, not their 
own wishes. Chief Justice Rehnquist eloquently emphasized this 
point when he wrote for the Court: 
No doubt is engendered by anything in this record but that 
Nancy Cruzan's mother and father are loving and caring par-
ents. If the State were required by the United States Constitu-
tion to repose a right of "substituted judgment" with anyone, 
the Cruzans would surely qualify. But we do not think the Due 
Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on these 
matters with anyone but the patient herself Close family mem-
bers may have a strong feeling-a feeling not at all ignoble or 
unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either-that they do 
not wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one 
which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrad-
ing. But there is no automatic assurance that the view of close 
family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's 
would have been had she been confronted with the prospect 
of her situation while competent. All of the reasons previ-
ously discussed for allowing Missouri to require clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes lead us to con-
clude that the State may choose to defer only to those wishes, 
rather than confide the decision to close family members. 15 
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
13. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
14. /d. at 268-69. 
15. /d. at 286-87 (emphasis added). 
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Under this reasoning, it would not have made any difference if 
some members of Cruzan's family had opposed the end of tube 
feeding; under Missouri law as upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Cruzan's wishes controlled. Only when her parents sub-
sequently supplied sufficient evidence of Cruzan's wishes did the 
state court issue its order to remove the feeding tube. 
In this respect, Florida law is similar to Missouri law. The 
relevant Florida law is set forth in the state's Health Care Ad-
vance Directives Act.16 Under that Act, when a patient in a per-
sistent vegetative state like Schiavo has not executed an advance 
directive, authority to make health care decisions on her behalf 
is entrusted to a "proxy."17 If the patient has a court-appointed 
guardian, then the guardian serves as the proxy.18 Otherwise, the 
proxy is the patient's closest relative as designated in the statute, 
beginning with the patient's spouse.19 The Florida statute pro-
vides in pertinent part that: 
... a proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging 
procedures must be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the decision would have been the one the patient 
would have chosen had the patient been competent or, if 
there is no indication of what the patient would have chosen, 
that the decision is in the patient's best interest.20 
The statute expressly provides that '"life-prolonging procedures"' 
include "artificially provided sustenance and hydration," such as 
tube feeding.21 To assure that the patient's wishes are followed, 
the statute provides that "the patient's family" or "any other in-
terested person" may seek judicial review of a proxy's decisions 
if that person believes that the "pro~'s decision is not in accord 
with the patient's known desires.'m This statutory regime ap-
plied in the Schiavo case because Terri Schiavo did not have an 
advance directive. Rather than use his statutory authority as 
proxy, Terri Schiavo's husband Michael petitioned a state trial 
court to decide the issue of Terri's continued tube feeding, and 
that court appointed a guardian for Terri. Thus Michael did not 
act as Terri's proxy in making the decision to withdraw tube 
feeding, which put him in much the same legal position as the 
16. FLA. STAT.§ 765 (2000). 
17. FLA. STAT.§ 765.101(15) (2000). 
18. FLA. STAT.§ 765.401(1)(a) (2000). 
19. FLA. STAT.§ 765.401(1)(b) (2000). 
20. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (2000). 
21. FLA. STAT.§ 765.101(10) (2000). 
22. FLA. STAT. § 765.105(1) (2000). 
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parents in Nancy Cruzan's case-suppliants to the court rather 
than statutorily empowered decision makers. Even if Michael 
had acted as Terri's proxy in requesting the termination of tube 
feeding, other family members could have contested his decision 
in court. In either event, so long as there was any evidence of her 
wishes, in Florida (as in Missouri), clear and convincing evidence 
of the patient's wishes must support a decision to withdraw life-
sustaining procedures. Just as the Missouri courts ultimately 
ruled in Cruzan's case, the Florida courts held that this standard 
was satisfied in Schiavo's case. 
In short, the Schiavo case followed Cruzan. The decision to 
terminate tube feeding was based on clear and convincing evi-
dence of Terri Schiavo's wishes. This was precisely what the 
courts required in the Cruzan case. Family disputes and state dif-
ferences should have had no impact on their outcomes. 
Of course, critics of the decision in Schiavo can (and do) 
contest the facts of the case, and thus dispute whether it com-
ports so neatly with Cruzan. Some question whether Schiavo was 
in a persistent vegetative state. Some deny that the evidence of 
her desire to terminate tube feeding was clear and convincing. 
Some allege that her husband's personal interests in the outcome 
should have precluded him from having any say in the decision. 
Yet all of these same issues could have been (and were) raised 
by critics of the decision in Cruzan and each of them can arise in 
any similar case. No medical diagnosis of a persistent vegetative 
state is beyond question, particularly by family members who 
hope or pray for the patient's recovery. No evidence, except 
perhaps an explicit advance directive, is likely to be clear and 
convincing to everyone concerned. And as the Supreme Court 
noted in the above-quoted passage from Cruzan, even loving 
and caring family members can bring personal interests into 
proxy decision-making.23 
None of these hypothetical factual disputes reaches to the 
heart of the matter for pro-life critics of the Schiavo decision, 
however. Even if the patient's condition and wishes were clear, 
and even if family members agreed and were wholly disinter-
ested, some pro-life proponents would still equate the termina-
tion of tube feeding in Schiavo-like cases with assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, or even murder. Perhaps America's most respected 
pro-life bio-ethicist is Valparaiso University philosophy profes-
sor Gilbert Meilaender, a charter member of the President's 
23. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
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Council on Bioethics. When asked in an interview about the 
Christian ethical guidelines for removing the feeding tube in the 
Schiavo case, Meilaender responded: 
There have normally been two kinds of grounds on which one 
could reject a treatment: if it is useless, or if it is very burden-
some for the patient. In Schiavo's case, it is counterintuitive to 
say it's useless when it kept her alive for so long, and she did 
not seem to experience it as a burden. 24 
He went on to question whether tube feeding should ever be 
considered a form of medical treatment by noting that 
"[n]ourishment is something we all need to stay alive, and the 
fact that for certain people it has to be provided in different ways 
doesn't alter the fact that nourishment is fundamental to human 
life in a way that various treatments are not."25 To him, it would 
not necessarily matter whether Schiavo was in a persistent vege-
tative state26 or if she had indisputably expressed her wishes to 
die in such a situation.27 "Autonomous choice doesn't count for 
everything. We don't give unlimited free rein to autonomy," he 
stated, citing legal limits on physician assisted suicide as an ex-
ample.28 Most critically, he added, "morally, there are certainly 
limits on what we may rightly choose. "29 For people who think 
like Meilaender-and Meilaender is a very clear-thinking bio-
ethicist-the fundamental issue in the Schiavo case was the ter-
mination of tube feeding. On this critical issue, there was no fac-
tual difference between the Schiavo and Cruzan cases 
whatsoever. Both involved the intentional termination of a life 
by removing a useful, non-burdensome feeding tube from an in-
competent patient. For some, doing so is immoral and should be 
illegal-but Cruzan may limit constitutional options. 
III. CONSIDERING OPTIONS IN LIGHT OF 
CRUZAN 
In 2005, after Terri Schiavo died in the glare of national 
publicity, I asked the students in my Law and Medicine course 
on their final exam: "[a]fter reviewing the Florida statute in light 
24. Jeff M. Sellers, When to PuU a Feeding Tube, CHRisTIANITY TODAY, May 2005, 
at 48 (interview with Gilbert Meilaender). 
25. !d. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. at 49. 
28. !d. 
29. !d. 
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of the Schiavo case, please propose and analyze the constitution-
ality of any changes or additions to the statute that you believe 
would improve the legal handling of such situations in the fu-
ture." In their answers, most students praised the Florida statute 
for permitting all parties to have their say and then allowing 
Schiavo's wishes to control her fate. Many students criticized the 
statute, however, and proposed various changes in it to discour-
age another Schiavo-like case. Their proposals, which parallel 
those that I have heard coming from pro-life critics of the 
Schiavo case, fell into three basic categories. Some would re-
quire consensus among family members before withdrawing a 
feeding tube from an incompetent patient. Others would raise 
the standard of proof regarding the patient's wishes to terminate 
tube feeding, such as requiring a written advance directive or 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Still others would require that 
the tube feeding continue so long as it benefited the patient. The 
issue then becomes, can these proposals be squared with Cruzan. 
A. REQUIRING FAMILY CONSENSUS 
Requiring that all close family members agree before life-
sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn from an incompe-
tent patient has the advantage of avoiding the type of intra-
family dispute that characterized the Schiavo case. Nevertheless, 
the requirement is at odds with the emphasis on patient auton-
omy that underlies Cruzan and the entire body of state constitu-
tional, statutory, and common law that has developed in this 
field. When faced with the issue, state courts virtually always up-
hold the right of competent individuals to forego life-sustaining 
treatment, including tube feeding. 30 Indeed, after reviewing a se-
ries of such state-court decisions, the Court in Cruzan wrote: 
"[w]e assume that the United States Constitution would grant a 
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
life-sustaining hydration and nutrition."31 Further, by statute, 
virtually every state authorizes its residents to execute some 
form of legally-enforceable advance directive to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining procedures, including tube feeding.32 
Except perhaps in the case of a minor, none of these decisions or 
statutes qualifies as an individual's right to refuse treatment by 
30. Eaton and Larson, supra note 2, at 1272. 
31. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
32. For a discussion of various forms of advance directives and their widespread 
acceptance, see Eaton and Larson, supra note 2, at 1295-1318. 
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requiring the consent of one's family members. Quite to the con-
trary, they ty{!ically stress that this is an individual's intensely 
personal right.33 
Beginning with the landmark case of In re Quinlan/4 courts 
have extended the right to refuse treatment to incompetent indi-
viduals, reasoning that it should not be lost merely because the 
individual can neither exercise it nor sense its violation.35 As in 
Quinlan, so long as clear evidence exists of the incompetent in-
dividual's intent, courts regularly allow a surrogate decision-
maker to exercise the right to refuse treatment on behalf of the 
individual?6 This happened in Cruzan, where the issue became 
simply the standard of proof required to establish Nancy Cru-
zan's intent, not whether treatment could be terminated at all. 
The Missouri Supreme Court stressed that the right to terminate 
tube feeding belonged exclusively to Cruzan, based on clear and 
convincing evidence of her wishes, and not to her parents. 37 The 
United States Supreme Court upheld this approach.38 Requiring 
the consent of family members before giving effect to a patient's 
wishes would fly in the face of the individual-autonomy rational 
for granting individuals the right to refuse treatment in the first 
place. It can not easily be squared with Cruzan. 
B. HEIGHTENING THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
It is easier to reconcile the Cruzan decision with a height-
ened standard of proof regarding an incompetent's desire to 
terminate life-sustaining treatment than to reconcile it with re-
quiring family consensus for terminating such treatment. It was 
the standard of proof, not family consensus, that was the central 
issue in Cruzan. For terminating life-sustaining treatment for an 
incompetent individual, Missouri had imposed a higher standard 
of proof regarding the individual's intent than normally required 
in civil actions.39 In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court 
simply held that imposing this higher standard did not violate the 
33. For example, in her concurring opinion in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor wrote that 
"the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, 
an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artifi-
cial delivery of food and water." 4fJ7 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
34. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1fJ76), cert. denied sub. nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 
922 (1fJ76). 
35. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,1229-33 (NJ. 1985). 
36. Eaton and Larson, supra note 2, at 1279. 
37. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424-46 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1998). 
38. Cruzan, 4fJ7 U.S. at 285-85. 
39. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425. 
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United States Constitution.40 It never suggested that other states 
could not impose different standards. If some state raised the bar 
still higher, such as by requiring proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or a written advance directive, the Supreme Court could 
uphold that heightened standard of proof without overruling or 
even distinguishing Cruzan. 
Nevertheless, any state statute further elevating the stan-
dard of proof for Schiavo-type cases would be vulnerable to con-
stitutional challenge. No state imposes a standard higher than 
clear and convincing evidence for such cases.41 Although all 
states authorize advance directives, as a practical matter no state 
requires them as a prerequisite to withhold or withdraw any 
form of medical treatment, including tube feeding.42 The Court's 
opinion in Cruzan simply upheld Missouri's clear and convincing 
standard.43 It did not opine on the constitutionality of other 
standards.44 Only Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, ex-
pressed the view that states may freely impose whatever legal 
limits they chose on terminating of life-sustaininf medical treat-
ment so long as those limits apply to everyone.4 In her concur-
ring opinion, Justice O'Connor countered that the Constitution 
"may well" constrain a state's legal options in this field,46 and 
went on to add, as if for emphasis: "[t]oday we decide only that 
one State's practice does not violate the Constitution. "47 Four 
Justices dissented in Cruzan, with three of them joining in an 
opinion expressing the view that even Missouri's clear and con-
vincing standard of proof exceeded constitutionallimits.48 This 
dissenting opinion states: 
Missouri may constitutionally impose only those procedural 
requirements that serve to enhance the accuracy of a deter-
mination of Nancy Cruzan's wishes or are at least consistent 
with an accurate determination. The Missouri "safeguard" 
that the Court upholds today does not meet that standard. 
The determination needed in the context is whether the in-
40. Cruzan, 491 U.S. at 280. 
41. See Eaton and Larson, supra note 2, at 1278-80. 
42. See id. at 1280-86. 
43. Cruzan, 491 U.S. at 280. 
44. E.g., id., at 287 n.12. 
45. /d. at 300 {Scalia, J., concurring). 
46. /d. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
47. /d. at 292. 
48. /d. at 315-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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competent person would choose to live in a persistent vegeta-
tive state on life support or to avoid this medical treatment.49 
The dissenting justices presumably would draw the line at impos-
ing a normal, civil "more-likely-than-not" standard of proof in 
right-to-die cases, and clearly would oppose raising the bar still 
higher. I simply do not know how the current Court would rule on 
a state statute imposing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
or requiring a written advance directive to terminate tube feed-
ing for an incompetent person. 
C. OUTLAWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF TUBE FEEDING 
As discussed in section II above, many people (like pro-life . 
bioethicist Gilbert Meilaender) differentiate sharply between ar-
tificially administered nutrition and hydration (especially tube 
feeding) and life-sustaining medical treatment generally. Re-
flecting this widely-held view, statutes in many states encourage 
or even require that persons who execute living wills or other 
forms of advance directives to express their intent regarding the 
termination of artificially administered nutrition and hydration. 5° 
Such statutes further the interests of individual autonomy and 
informed consent that underlie Cruzan and the series of state 
"right-to-die" decisions (beginning with Quinlan) discussed with 
apparent approval in the Court's Cruzan opinion.51 Carrying this 
distinction further, however, to the point of imposing specific 
statutory limits solely on the termination of tube feeding, or out-
lawing it altogether, raises significant concerns under Cruzan. 
Unlike its silence on the issue of imposing an evidentiary 
standard higher than clear and convincing for right-to-die cases, 
the Court's opinion in Cruzan expressly links "artificially deliv-
ered food and water essential to life" with other forms of "life-
sustaining medical treatment."52 It refers to both as "treatment" 
and assumes that competent persons have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse them.5 Citing authoritative statements of 
the American Medical Association and the Hastings Center, Jus-
tice O'Connor added in her concurring opinion: "[a]rtificial 
feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of 
49. I d. at 316. 
50. Eg., MINN. STAT.§ 145B.03 subd. 2(b)(l) and (2) (2002). 
51. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270-77. 
52. Id. at 279. 
53. ld. 
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medical treatment."54 The dissenting Justices made this point as 
well.55 Of the nine Justices deciding Cruzan in 1990, only Justice 
Scalia would seem willing to allow the states to differentiate be-
tween the termination of tube feeding and medical treatment.56 
When faced with the issue, state courts have not distinguished 
between withholding artificially-administered nutrition and hy-
dration and withholding life-sustaining medical treatment gener-
ally.57 To uphold a state statue that generally outlawed or signifi-
cantly restricted the termination of the tube feeding, the 
Supreme Court would have to overturn or sharply distinguish 
Cruzan, which is only likely to happen if it contains more Jus-
tices who think like Justice Scalia on this matter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The tragic cases of Terri Schiavo and Nancy Cruzan have 
undoubtedly prompted many Americans to reflect on their own 
personal wishes regarding tube feeding and to share those reflec-
tions with others. I have several friends who executed or revised 
advance treatment directives in the wake of these cases-with 
some declaring that they would want to be kept alive on tube 
feeding in a persistent vegetative state and others declaring just 
the opposite. They all remain my friends, and I respect their 
choices. My own pre-Cruzan living will expresses my desire to 
receive nutrition, hydration, and pain medication so long as they 
are beneficial. Personally, I hope that more people execute ad-
vance directives so that their wishes can be better known, ac-
cepted and followed, but I know that most Americans will not do 
so. As a consequence, there will be more cases like those involv-
ing Terri Schiavo. So long as the general approach set forth in 
Cruzan is followed, those cases will come out much like the 
Schiavo case. 
54. ld. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
55. ld. at 307-()8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Artificial delivery of food and water is 
regarded as medical treatment by the medical profession and the Federal Govern-
ment."). 
56. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57. E.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (1989) (court adopts the 
"consensus opinion (that) treats artificial nutrition and hydration as medical treatment.") 
The passage from Longeway is quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in 
Cruzan. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 276. 
